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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Right to Attack Interlocutory Order of
Administrative Body-Petitioner, producer of coal, filed a confidential
report on its business with the Bituminous Coal Commission, pursuant to
an order authorized by the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 .1 The Act pro-
hibited the disclosure of the information except as evidence in a hearing
under the Act. 2 The Commission issued a ruling interpreting the Act to
permit the disclosure to interested parties in advance of a hearing, and gave
notice of a proposed hearing. The Commission dismissed the petitioner's
complaint to the ruling and ordered its secretary to make the report avail-
able to interested parties in connection with the proposed hearing. Peti-
tioner appealed under the provisions of the Act.8 Held, appeal dismissed
because petitioner had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the
Act, which does not permit appeals from preliminary or procedural orders
entered in an ex parte proceeding. Mallory Coal Co. v. National Bituminous
Coal Comm., 99 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1938).
Petitioner filed with the Commission a confidential report pursuant to
the same order. The Commission ordered its secretary to make the report
available to interested parties in advance of proposed hearings. Petitioner
filed a bill to enjoin the disclosure of the confidential report as a violation
of the Act and as a threatened irreparable injury to its business. Held, no
injunction should issue because collateral judicial review cannot be obtained
for the reasons advanced in the Mallory case and also because the Act pro-
vides an exclusive appellate procedure; 4 also, equity will not enjoin admin-
istrative action involving an exercise of discretion in a matter within the
jurisdiction of the administrative body.5 Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bitu-
minous Coal Comm., 6 U. S. L. WEEK 493 (App. D. C. 1938), cert. granted,
C. C. H. Sup. Ct. Serv. 4547 (1938).6
The refusal to allow the direct appeal in the Mallory case was a sound
application of recently crystallized administrative principles. Although the
broad, general language of the Act 7 might be interpreted to permit an
appeal from any order of the Commission, it has been generally held, under
similar provisions, that interlocutory or preliminary orders are not review-
.I. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 828 et seq. (Supp. 1938). ". . . the Com-
mission may require reports from producers. . . ." Id. at 88, § 84oa.
2. "No information obtained from a producer . . . shall be made public without
the consent of the producer . . . except where such disclosure is made in evidence
in any hearing before the Commission. . . ." Ibid.
3. 50 STAT. 85 (937), iS U. S. C. A. § 836b (Supp. 1938) : "Any person aggrieved
by an order issued by the Commission in a proceeding to which such person is a party
may obtain a review of such order. . ..
4. 50 STAT. 86 (937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 836d (Supp. 1938) : "The jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court of Appeals of United States or the United States Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia, as the case may be, to enforce, set aside or modify orders of
the Commission shall be exclusive."
5. Relief was also denied under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 STAT.
955 (i934), as amended by 49 STAT. io27 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (Supp. '938).
6. Supreme Court also granted an injunction pendente lite.
7. See spra note 3. "An order" or "any order" has generally been held to mean
a final order. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 79 F. (2d) 617, 61g (C. C. A.
2d, i935) ; Notes (i935) 35 Coi. L. Ev. 230, 240, (1938) 47 Y-AL L. J. 766, 773.
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able.8 It has been pointed out that this construction is an application of the
broader principle that administrative remedies must be exhausted before
judicial review is available.9 Furthermore, since the ruling by the Commis-
sion was analogous to a quasi-legislative regulation, it did not meet the
requirement that a controversy in an adversary proceeding exist in advance
of an appeal.10
Hence, if the bill in the Utah case was merely an attempt to secure
indirectly the judicial review which was denied in the Mallory case, the
injunction was properly denied, especially in view of the provision of the
Act prescribing the appeal as the exclusive procedure for judicial review.11
However, the petitioner apparently was more seriously interested in pre-
serving its valuable property rights in its business secrets than in securing
a premature review of the Commission's ruling.1 2 Therefore, from the
viewpoint of general equity powers, the court should have considered the
question raised by the bill for the injunction, in spite of the general rule
that equity will not enjoin administrative officers performing discretionary
duties within their recognized authority.$8 Irreparable injury where the
administrative body acts in excess of its authority has been recognized as a
sound basis for avoiding the general rule.1 4 Although the concept of irrep-
arable injury has received varied applications,15 it should embrace the dis-
closure of the confidential reports threatened in the instant case where a
subsequent appeal from a final order would be useless.16 Furthermore,
since the Act does not expressly authorize disclosure in advance of a hear-
ing,'17 the Commission's interpretation through its ruling appears prima facie
arbitrary. Finally, any inconveniences to the government resulting from
8. Federal Power Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 3o4 U. S. 375 (1938) ; Third
Avenue Ry. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 85 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766.
9. Mallory case at 407. Red River Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm., 98 F. (2d) 282 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Southland Industries v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm., 99 F. (2d) 117 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Notes (1927) 27 COL. L. RaV. 450,
(1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 230.
Whatever the legal terminology describing the result, it is clear that the allowance
of an unlimited right of appeal from preliminary orders would greatly impair adminis-
trative efficiency and swamp the already crowded appellate courts with the additional
burden of considering many trivial procedural questions. See DicKiNsoN, ADmINIS-
TRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) 50; McGuire, Judicial Reviews
of Administrative Decisions (1938) 26 Gao. L. J. 574; Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766,
772 and cases cited therein.
io. United States v. Los Angeles R. R., 273 U. S. 299 (1927); Standard Oil Co.
v. Board of Purification of Waters, 43 R. 1. 336, 111 At. 887 (1921) ; Note (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 766.
ii. See supra note 4. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938),
86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 541; Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d)
441 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
12. Cf. Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766, 775.
13. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Coe, 96 F. (2d) 518 (App. D. C. 1938); see also
authorities cited in Utah case, n. 23; (1938) 16 TEx. L. REv. 257; (1928) 37 YALE L.
J. 988.
14. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 09o2);
Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923) ; Federal Trade Comm. v.
Millers' Nat. Assn, 23 F. (2d) 968 (App. D. C. 1927) ; Notes (1927) 27 COL. L. REV.
450, 453, (935) 35 COL. L. REV. 230, 239, (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766.
15. See supra note 14.
16. An antagonistic Commission could easily give notice of a proposed hearing,
publish the confidential report in order to coerce the petitioners and then cancel the
hearing.
17. See supra note 2. Of course, it is possible for the court to find that publication
of the reports in advance of a proposed hearing is implicit in the provisions of the Act.
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judicial interruptions of the efficient and orderly administrative process ",
are outweighed by the protection afforded to the petitioner's valuable busi-
ness rights. These seem to be sound reasons, in view of the doubtful basis
for the Commission's ruling, for testing its validity, prior to a final order,
through injunctive proceedings. 19
Bankruptcy-Involuntary Proceedings Against an Insane Person
-Guardian moved to dismiss involuntary bankruptcy proceedings on the
ground that the alleged bankrupt was insane when the supposed act of bank-
ruptcy was committed. Long before the debtor was adjudicated insane, a
judgment by default was obtained by a creditor which was not entered until
a few days after the adjudication of insanity ' at which time the debtor was
insolvent.2  The judgment was not discharged within the thirty day period
and the involuntary petition was subsequently filed within four months.
Held, that the motion to dismiss should be denied because involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceedings may be brought against an insane person where the act
of bankruptcy requires no intent or affirmative act. In re Tobin, 24 F.
Supp. 825 (D. Minn. 1938).
Had there been no question of insanity in the instant case, the debtor,
having suffered a lien to be obtained which was not vacated within thirty
days, would clearly have committed an act of bankruptcy under both the
Act of 1898 s and the Chandler Act.4  Since the debtor was insane, how-
ever, the court was confronted with an unusual problem. It has been recog-
nized both in England and the United States that an insane person because
of his mental incapacity cannot enter a voluntary petition of bankruptcy
without the consent of the probate court. 5 For the same reason it has been
held that an insane person is incapable of committing an act of bankruptcy."
Involuntary proceedings may, however, be brought against an insane person
i. See supra note 9.
ig. The injunction would not necessarily interfere with the Commission's right to
introduce the reports as evidence at a hearing actually in progress; nor would it seri-
ously prejudice the Commission's judgment on the merits of the hearing since it involves
an interpretation of one procedural section of the Act. On the other hand, it would be
futile for the petitioners to complain repeatedly of the ruling at each stage of the admin-
istrative process. See Notes (927) 27 COL. L. REV. 450, (935) 35 COL. L. REv. 230.
I. By Minnesota statute, the mere docketing of the judgment created a lien on the
debtor's real property. 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 940o.
2. The court does not discuss the debtor's insolvency. For a recent article attack-
ing the concept of acts of bankruptcy and advocating the substitution of the concept of
insolvency see Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bank-
rutcy Law (938) 52 HARv. L. REv. i89.
3. 30 STAT. 544 (i898), ii U. S. C. A. § r et seq. (927).
4. Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 27, 1938), "1 U. S. C. A. § I et seq.
(Supp. 1938).
5. Matter of Clinton, 41 F. (2d) 749 (S. D. Cal. i93o). But cf. Matter of Eisen-
berg, 117 Fed. 786 (S. D. N. Y. 1902). In re Lee, 23 Ch. D. 216 (x883) ; In re James,
12 Q. B. D. 332 (884) ; see In re Cahen, io Ch. D. 183, 184 (1879) ; In re Farnham,
(895) 2 Ch. 799, 802.
6. In re Marvin, i6 Fed. Cas. No. 9,178 (E. D. Mo. 187i) ; In re Pratt, i9 Fed. Cas.
No. 11,371 (D. Mass. 1872); In re Weitzel, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,365 (W. D. Wis.
i876) ; In re Funk, ioi Fed. 244 (N. D. Iowa i9oo) ; In re Kehler, 153 Fed. 235 (W.
D. N. Y. 1907) ; In re Ward, i6x Fed. 755 (D. N. J. i9o8) ; Matter of Holmes, 13 F.
(2d) 653 (D. Minn. 1926) ; Matter of Clinton, 41 F. (2d) 749 (S. D. Cal. 1930) ; Ex
parte Stamp, I De Gex 345 (Bankr. 1846).
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who committed an act of bankruptcy while sane.7 The court in the instant
case, while fundamentally accepting these doctrines," applied to a new situ-
ation an old distinction that has been made between "active" and "passive"
acts of bankruptcy. It was reasoned that since the case arose under one of
the so-called "passive" sections of the Bankruptcy Act which do not require
an affirmative act or intent,9 the mental capacity of the debtor was imma-
terial. 1 In modem times, an insane person ordinarily has the same right
to sue or to be sued as a sane person."' In the Tobin case, for example, in
the absence of the bankruptcy proceedings, the creditor's judgment would
have been binding, exhausting all the assets of the debtor.'. Thus there
would seem to be no reason, other than a literal and technical one, for de-
priving the debtor of the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act or for relieving her
of its effects. 18 The instant decision in enlarging the class of persons who
may be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts, affords protection to both debtor
and creditor.14
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Admission of Negro to
State University Law School-Although otherwise fully qualified,
petitioner, a negro, was refused admission to the only state supported law
school because of his color. Claiming that this constituted a denial of equal
protection, he sought a writ of mandamus to compel the curators of the uni-
versity to admit him. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the writ I on
the ground that a statutory scholarship 2 for education in an adjacent state
7. It re Pratt, i9 Fed. Gas. No. 11,371 (D. Mass. 1872); In re Weitzel, 29 Fed.
Gas. No. I7,365 (W. D. Wis. 1876) ; In re Kehler, 153 Fed. 235 (W. D. N. Y. 19o7) ;
In re Ward, i6i Fed. 755 (D. N. J. z9o8); Matter of Holmes, 13 F. (2d) 653 (D.
Minn. 1926) ; Matter of Clinton, 41 F. (2d) 749 (S. D. Cal. i93o). Section 8 of both
the Bankruptcy Act of i898, 3o STAT. 549 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § 26 (i927), and the
Chandler Act, ii U. S. C. A. § 26 (Supp. 1938), provides that the subsequent insanity
of a bankrupt shall not abate proceedings against him. Cf. Anon, i3 Ves. Jun. 59o (Ch.
1807) ; It re Leavesley, (i89i) 2 Ch. i.
8. Instant case at 826.
9. The instant case came under § 3a (4) of the Bankruptcy Act of i898, as amended
by Act of May 27, 1926, 44 STAT. 663 (1926), II U. S. C. A. §2Ia (4) (927). This
section was combined with § 3a (3) of that Act to form § 3a (3) of the new Chandler
Act, ii U. S. C. A. § 21a (3) (Supp. 1938). For a discussion of the "passive" nature
of the old sections see Wilson Bros. v. Nelson, 183 U. S. igi (igoi) ; In re New Lots
Sash and Door Corp., 3 F. Supp. 57o, 572 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
lo. Instant case at 828.
ii. A leading case is King v. Robinson, 33 Me. i4 (i85r)." Other cases are col-
lected in 32 C. J. 763.
12. Instant case at 828.
x3. An analogy may be made to involuntary proceedings brought against a dissolved
corporation. In re 211 East Delaware Place Building Corp., 76 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935); see (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 311.
14. In England, when a person who has been adjudicated insane has bankruptcy
proceedings brought against him, that part of his property which is necessary for his
support and maintenance is set aside to be administered in his behalf. Only the remain-
der, if there is any, is distributed pro rata among his creditors. In re Leavesley, (I89 i )
2 Ch. i; In re Winkle, (r894) 2 Ch. 519; In re Farnham, (1895) 2 Ch. 799.
I. State exr tel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S. W. (2d) 783 (Mo. 1938). For a dis-
cussion of the instant case before it was decided by the Missouri court see (1936) 21
ST. Louis L. REV. 26o.
2. "Pending the full development of the Lincoln university (the state supported
college for negroes), the board of curators shall have the authority to arrange for the
attendance of negro residents of the state of Missouri at the university of any adjacent
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established substantial equality when adequate instruction was not available
at the state-maintained university for negroes. On appeal, held (Justices
McReynolds and Butler dissenting) that the state court's judgment should
be reversed. When the state assumed the function of legal education, it
was obliged under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to offer equal facilities to all citizens regardless of color, and this obligation
was not fulfilled by providing for the education of negroes outside the state
when white students could obtain instruction within the state. State ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 59 Sup. Ct. 232 (1938).
The significance of this decision lies in its negative answer to the ques-
tion left unanswered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in University of
Maryland v. Murray -whether a fund for study outside the state would
discharge the state's duty to provide higher education for negroes equal to
that afforded the white race.4 It is well settled that a state by statute can
require separate schools for the white and colored races, provided each has
an equality of facilities.5 This principle applies both to elementary and
advanced learning. In the case of segregation in higher education, a diffi-
culty not presented in elementary schooling arises-that the demand by
negroes for such training is frequently so negligible that the establishment
of separate institutions for them would be impractical 6 Nevertheless, the
right to equal protection is independent of the demand for the particular
service, and must be scrupulously protected as a personal right.7  The
statutory provision 8 for out-of-the-state scholarships in the instant case was
an attempt to reconcile this absolute right with the separation of the races
for professional education. The dissenting justices would have sustained it
as a sufficient answer to the negroes' demand for higher learning, and as a
sensible means of settling a difficult practical problem. But as pointed out
by counsel for appellant, the student would have less opportunity to study
Missouri law and practice in another state, and would not have the prestige
incident to a Missouri law school education among his prospective clientele.
The majority of the Court, however, rejected these considerations and
adopted a far broader ground in holding that the scholarship provision
would not satisfy the state's obligation because the state had to provide
state to take any course or to study any subjects provided for at the state university
of Missouri, and which are not taught at the Lincoln university and to pay the reason-
able tuition fees for such attendance; prozdded that whenever the board of curators
deem it advisable they shall have the power to open any necessary school or depart-
ment." 2 Mo. Ray. STAT. (1929) § 9622.
3. I69 Md. 478, 487, 182 Atl. 590, 594 (1935), 20 MINN. L. REv. 673 (1936), 45
YALE L. J. 1296.
4. The court refused to rule on the problem because the scholarship provisions
made by the state were inadequate, and it was on this ground that a mandamus order
was issued for the admission of a qualified negro to the University of Maryland Law
School. Ibid.
5. See Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 157, and cases collected in BLACK, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1927) 577, n. 47, and 1O3 A. L. R. 7,3 (1936).
6. In the dissenting opinion, Mr. justice McReynolds pointed out that "never be-
fore has a negro applied for admission to the law school, and none has ever asked that
Lincoln University provide legal instruction." 59 Sup. Ct. at 238.
7. In a case involving separate railroad accommodations for a negro, the Court
said: "This argument With respect to the volume of traffic seems to us to be Without
merit. It makes the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who may
be discriminated against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a
personal one." McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U. S. 151, 161 (94).
8. For similar statutory provisions in other states, see (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1298,
n1.8.
480 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
educational equality within its borders, and could not depend on another
sovereign government to discharge such obligationsY By adopting this
broad interpretation of the equal protection clause, the Court avoided the
uncertainties that might have arisen from a decision based on the factual
inadequacy of the particular out-of-state scholarship offered in the instant
case.
10
Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Jurisdiction of the
N. L. R. B. over Intrastate Power Cornpany-Petitioning power com-
pany purchased a large part 1 of its raw materials outside the state but sold
all of its product within the state. It supplied electric current to several
interstate carriers and other interstate utilities; 2 it also supplied 97.50 of
the current used in New York City. Petitioner appealed from a cease and
desist order of the N. L. R. B. on the ground 3 that the Board had no juris-
diction over it. Held, (justices Butler and McReynolds dissenting) 4 that
the Board had jurisdiction inasmuch as continuity of service by petitioner
was essential to the operation of these interstate utilities and hence to the
free flow of interstate commerce. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B.,
59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
9. The Supreme Court of California has held that the duty of the state to provide
educational facilities for colored and Indian children equal to those supplied to white
children in separated schools was not satisfied because a school maintained by the Fed-
eral government was located in the district. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal.
664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924).
lo. After the decision in the instant case, a bill was introduced in the North Caro-
lina legislature providing for the establishment of graduate and professional courses for
negro students at the two state supported colleges for that race. Phila. Evening Bulle-
tin, Jan. 10, 1939, p. 28, col. 5.
i. All of the coal and oil, a substantial portion of the copper and approximately 30
per cent. of the cable used by the company was purchased outside the state. For a com-
plete statement of facts see In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 4
N. L. R. B. 71, 75 (1937).
2. Among its customers were 5 interstate railroads, 2 telegraph companies, i tele-
phone company, i radio broadcasting company, 6 Government lighthouses, the Port of
New York Authority, the Hudson River ferries, Floyd Bennett Airport, and the New
York Stock Exchange. 4 N. L. R. B. 71, 79-82 (1937).
3. In addition to the jurisdictional objection, there were also objections to the sub-
stance of the order. "The order directed the company to desist from labor practices
found to be unfair and in violation of section 8 (1) and (3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. . . ." See 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (i) and (3) (Supp.
1938). The implications of this order will be the subject of separate treatment and are
not discussed here.
4. These two Justices dissented on the jurisdiction point, basing their opinion on
Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U. S. 238 (1936). Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91 F. (2d) 790
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) : "Carter v. Carter Coal Co. and similar cases are overruled by
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation!' But cf.
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453, 469 (1938), affirming the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, where the majority of the Court does not con-
sider the question.
Justices Reed and Black agreed with the majority of the Court that the Board had
jurisdiction but dissented from the decision of the majority that the Board was without
authority to require petitioner to desist from giving effect to contracts with the Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers and its local unions, recognizing the Brotherhood as the
collective bargaining agency for its members and containing stipulations as to hours,
working conditions, wages and arbitration in the event of disputes.
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This decision increases the class of intrastate producers to whom the
Wagner Act r applies. Previously, the Court has upheld the jurisdiction
of the Board,6 first, where production is a link between the importation of
raw materials from other states and sale of the finished product in interstate
commerce, 7 and second, where the source of the raw materials and produc-
tion are both local, but there is a "substantial" sale of the product across
state lines; 8 that there is jurisdiction third, where sale of the product is
entirely intrastate, but a large proportion of the raw materials are brought
in from outside, seems clear,9 although there is no Supreme Court authority
for this proposition under the Wagner Act. The Court in the instant case
expressly did not base its decision on this point,0 but held instead that the
Board also has jurisdiction where the raw materials are secured locally and
both production and distribution are local, but where a substantial part of
the product is actually consumed by instrumentalities of interstate and for-
eign commerce. It is clear from this decision that the Court is now using
a different method of approach in deciding what "affects commerce"." The
standard test-Does the activity sought to be regulated "directly" "2 affect
interstate commerce ?-still obtains. 3 But the requirement of directness in
the sense of propinquity, necessitating a primary relation between the
activity in question and the movement of goods in interstate commerce,' 4
has been changed into a broader concept of "substantial effect" from a fac-
tual point of view.' 5 Instead of a mechanical application of the test in an
5. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
6. See, generally, Donoho, Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board--
The Developing Concept of Interstate Commerce (1938) 6 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 436;
Mueller, Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act (1937) 35 Mice. L.
REV. 1286; Notes (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 491; (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1221.
7. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1 (1937); N. L. R. B.
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 3o1 U. S. 58 (1937), 85 U. oF PA. L. REV. 733.
8. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 3o3 U. S. 453 (1938) ; see also
Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1221, 1222.
9. See Mueller, supra note 6, at 1296.
io. "In the present instance we may lay on one side . . . the mere purchases by
the utilities of the supplies . . . although very large . . . which came from with-
out the State. . . . Apart from those purchases there is undisputed . . . evidence
of the dependence of interstate and foreign commerce upon the continuity of service by
petitioning companies." Instant case at 213. The decision was based rather on the
catastrophic effect which an interruption in service by petitioner as the result of labor
strife would have on interstate commerce.
11. "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 49 STAT.
450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (7) (Supp. 1938).
12. But see infra note 19.
13. "It is the effect upon interstate commerce, not the source of the injury which
is the criterion of congressional power." This language which has been repeatedly re-
ferred to by the Court was part of the decision in Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. I, 51 (I91). See also Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 544
(1935) ; N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1, 32 0937).
The Court again referred to the Rate Cases (The Shreveport Case, Houston, E.
& W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914); Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U. S. 563 (1922) ; New York v. United States, 257 U. S.
591 (1922)), but the decision seems to be actually based on the ground mentioned supra
note lo.
14. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 3o9 (1936).
IS. Cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R- B., 303 U. S. 453, 467 (1938);
see Note (1939) 52 HA.v. L. REv. 491, 496.
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"intellectual vacuum",16 such as was used in the Carter 1 and Schechter ' 8
cases, there is a growing tendency on the part of the Court toward a more
realistic approach to the question, and toward a broader interpretation of
federal authority over labor disputes of a national character.' 9 The solution
of the problem no longer depends on the number of steps existing between
production and interstate commerce, but rather on whether a labor dispute
in a given plant 20 might in fact 21 result in an obstruction to commerce.
Corporations-Restraints on the Alienation of Shares-The
articles of the defendant corporation provided that, as to the ordinary shares,
the corporation might at any time compel shareholders who were not em-
ployees to sell at a price equal "to the asset value, exclusive of good will and
going concern value". The directors decided to purchase the shares of the
plaintiff, whereupon he brought a bill in equity to restrain them. Upon a
demurrer by the defendant it was held, that the provision was a restraint
on alienation and, in the absence of special circumstances, was void as con-
trary to public policy. Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 2 A. (2d) 249
(Del. Ch. 1938).
Qualifications on the rights of ownership of corporate shares have been
a source of much confusion in the law. Viewing them as contracts between
the corporation and the shareholder' or as qualifications attached to the
I6. "We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to
deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum." N. L.
R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I, 41 (1937).
17. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) (holding the Guffey Coal Act
of 1935 unconstitutional).
I8. Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935) (holding the provisions of
the Live Poultry Code of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional).
1g. See CORWiN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1938) 124; Donoho, supra note 6,461.
There has also been a change, intentional or not, in the use of language. In the
Santa Cruz case, the Court looked for a "close and substantial" relation to interstate
commerce, although the word "direct" was also used. In the instant case neither "di-
rect" nor "substantial" was used, the Court merely stating that the effect of an inter-
ruption in service would be a "matter of federal concern". But cf. Corwin, The
Schechter Case-Landmark or What? (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 15, 171, sug-
gesting that these verbal formula are merely devices used by the Court to reach a
desired result.
20. "Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a close and
intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control . . . is left . . . to be deter-
mined as individual cases arise." N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301U. S. 1, 32 Q1937).
21. It is interesting to note the heavy emphasis placed by the Court on the con-
sumption of petitioner's power by instrumentalities of interstate commerce, since this
was actually only a small part of its total output. But cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453, 467 (1938). '. . . the fact that petitioner's sales
in interstate and foreign commerce ammounted to 37 per cent., and not to more than
5o per cent., of its production cannot be deemed controlling."
Thus the distinction between kind or character of business and intensity or amount
of business insisted upon in the Carter case is apparently becoming less important. Cf.
85 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 733, 734 (1937).
It is too early to predict whether the jurisdiction of the Board will extend to an
industry purely local in character but of sufficient magnitude so that a strike would
necessarily affect commerce, indirectly to be sure, but nevertheless substantially. When
this problem arises, there will also be the problem of conflict of jurisdiction with state
labor relations boards. Cf. the dissent by Justice Butler in the instant case.
i. The instant case followed this rationale which was enunciated in Lawson v.
Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (930), aff'g, 17 Del. Ch. 1,
147 Ati. 312 (1929), 78 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 422 (193o). A logical flaw lies in the fact
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shares at the time of issue,2 courts have attempted to formulate rules to
govern their validity. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that
it makes the decision depend on factors which are foreign to the basic issue 3
of whether the restriction is sufficiently justifiable in the particular case to
override the general policy against restraints on alienation. This policy
would seem to be particularly strong in the case of corporate shares,4 for
where ownership is separated from control as it is in the typical corporation,5
it is important that the shareholder be able to convert his shares into money
when he disapproves of the management. Hence it appears reasonable to
regard any substantial 6 restraint as prima facie improper,7 thereby throwing
on the corporation the burden of showing a special justification in the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. Viewing the factual holdings of the cases
in this light, it will be found that courts have properly upheld restrictions in
certain situations." Although not expressly mentioned in the opinions, one
decisive factor appears to be an identity of ownership with control in the
corporate structure. Thus, in cases where shareholders are in complete
control of a small corporation, provisions giving the corporation a prior
option to the shares of a shareholder who wishes to sell, have been upheld
as reasonable.9 Also, where the nature of the business is precarious and
demands that the employees have a direct interest in the corporation,10 or
where it is desirable to keep shares within a given class of tradesmen,1'
that, due to a lack of mutuality, the theory can furnish no basis for imposing the restric-
tion upon a subsequent purchaser.
2. See (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 422, 423. The difficulty with such reasoning is
that it necessitates a determination of reasonableness as of the time of incorporation
and not of the time of the suit. Also it would necessitate a distinction between pro-
visions in the articles and in the by-laws.
3. See mupra notes I and 2. Perhaps the most desirable rationale is the suggestion
that the courts are, in fact, allowing equitable servitudes on personalty. Note (1929)
42 HAv. L. REV. 555, 558. If courts were to adopt this theory the logical problem of
the subsequent purchaser would be eliminated and reasonableness could be determined
as of the time of the suit. See Chafee, Equitable Ser4tudes on Chattels (1928) 41
HARv. L. REV. 945.
4. See Bmu.E AND PEDERSON, LIQum CLAIMS AND NATIONAL WEALTH (1934)
10, n1.
5. BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933)
281 et seq.6. A distinction must be made between those regulations for the transfer of shares
which are imposed merely for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the sharehold-
ers, etc., and restrictions imposed for ulterior purposes. The former have always been
regarded as a legitimate subject of corporate legislation while the latter depend upon
their reasonableness. See Miller v. Farmers Milling & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 443,
11o N. W. 995, 996 (1907).
7. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930);
Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S. W. io66 (1916).
8. Note (1932) 30 Mica. L. REV. 766.
9. People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924) (small newspaper);
Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W. 957 (1920) (five share-
holders) ; Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N. J. Eq. '597, 124 Atl. 1i8 (1924) (five share-
holders); Bloomingdale v. Bloomingdale, 107 Misc. 646, 177 N. Y. Supp. 873 (1919)
(six shareholders). Where there were but three shareholders, formerly partners, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly refused to make an exception on the rather ques-
tionable ground that even in such a situation there was a distinction between ownership
and control. In re Klaus, 67 Wis. 401, 408, 29 N. W. 582, 585 (1886).
io. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930).
ii. Barret v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934 (19o2) (liquor dealers). But see
Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 191 Atl. 887, 89o (Del. Ch. 1937) (tanners).
Justification is often based on the assumption that an unsympathetic shareholder would
be detrimental to the best interests of the corporation and that therefore the members
of the corporation should have the privilege of choosing their associates. However,
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similar provisions have been upheld. Not only were no such special circum-
stances shown in the instant case, but the restriction in question was far
more serious than a mere option in the corporation in case the shareholder
wished to sell, and it would have had a severe effect on the marketability
of the shares.1 2 It would seem, therefore, that the court was clearly correct
when, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, it invalidated the re-
striction.
Evidence-Power of Judge to Comment on Weight of Evidence
and Credibility of Witnesses-Defendants were convicted in a crim-
inal prosecution in a federal district court. The judge, in instructing the
jury, had expressed his opinion that the defendants' testimony was fabri-
cated but that the Government's witness "meticulously tried to tell the
truth". Held, that the conviction be reversed; the power of comment should
be limited to cases where the facts are not in dispute.' United States v.
Meltzer, C. C. A. 7th, Dec. 20, 1938.
In thus limiting the power of comment, the court in effect has repudi-
ated a century-old doctrine, 2 repeatedly asserted without dissent by all
courts within the federal jurisdiction.2 Though today the minority rule,4
the federal practice of permitting reasonable comment is actually a hold-over
from the common law,5 considered by many commentators absolutely essen-
tial to the proper functioning of the trial-by-jury system.8 The contrary
view, now adhered to in 36 states,7 rests primarily upon the assumption that
. . . dissenting shareholders who make things unpleasant for the group in control
often act as efficient deterrents against dubious practices and they are not always to be
discouraged." Levy, Purchase by a Corporation of its Own Stock (1930) 15 MINN. L.
REV. I, 31.
12. Under this provision an owner of shares ran the risk of losing them at any time
for a mere liquidation value.
I. Evans, J., concurred on the ground that the trial judge had abused his discretion.
(The advance report is somewhat confusing in that Judge Major's opinion, in which
Treanor, J., joined, is referred to as a "concurring" opinion.)
2. See THAYER, A. PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMoN LAW
(1898) I88, n. 2, and cases cited therein.
3. See cases cited in the concurring opinion of Evans, J. This list includes several
Supreme Court cases and at least one lower court decision from each circuit. The Fed-
eral Criminal Code contains no provision affecting the exercise of the power in the fed-
eral courts. I8 U. S. C. A. § 541 et seq. (927).
4. Comment is allowed in twelve jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, New York,
and New Jersey, in addition to the federal courts. For a complete list, see Note (1937)
25 CALIF. L. REy. 212, 213, n. 6.
5. HALF, HISTORY OF THE CoMmoN LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1820) 346. The
practice has always been followed in England. Lawson and Keedy, Criminal Pkocedure
in England (1gio-ii) I J. CRIM. L. 595, 756.
6. See THAYER, loc. cit. supra note 2; 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 255r;
Otis, "Governor of the Trial" or "Referee at the Gaine" (1937) 21 J. AM. Jun. Soc.
105. The last was written in opposition to the bill introduced in and passed by the
House of Representatives in June, 1937, which was designed to take away the power
of comment in federal courts. The passage of the bill in the House was greeted with
a storm of protest by eminent jurists and commentators. The same attitude was taken
by the American Bar Association, whose position is stated in Note (1937) 23 A. B. A.
J. 521. Apparently the bill was killed in the Senate.
7. See Note (I937) 25 CALIF. L. REV. 212, 213. Thayer attributes the origin of
the rule to a misconstruction of Coke. THAYER, loc. cit. supra note 2. Cf. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (Stud. ed. 1935) § 469. It has also been suggested that it arose from petty
quarrels between the bench and bar. Johnson, Province of Judge in Jury Trials (1928)
12 J. Am. JuD. SoC. 76. Whatever its origin, it crept into the law of the majority of
states, by constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision. Ibid.
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it is inconsistent with the theory of the jury trial for the judge to comment
upon the facts, and that reference thereto robs the jury of its power to
render an independent verdict.8 The majority of the court in the instant
case, undoubtedly influenced by this argument, reached the conclusion that
expressions of opinion upon issues to be left to the jury should be limited
to situations where the facts are undisputed, and then sought to substantiate
its position by denying that the Supreme Court had ever sanctioned the
practice so long prevailing in the lower federal courts. It is true that the
high Court has always proceeded cautiously when considering the propriety
of a trial judge's comments, 9 and has surrounded the power with certain
limitations, most important of which is that the jury be made to understand
clearly that the ultimate determination as to the facts rests with them.10 It
is equally true, however, that all jurisdictions recognizing the power have
similarly restricted its exercise," and abuse thereof has always been grounds
for reversal.1 2 It is highly improbable that the Supreme Court intended to
fetter the trial judges with restrictions so strong as to amount to a denial
of the power. At most its caution seems to have been directed solely to the
prevention of possible abuses of discretion. But the majority opinion not
only repudiates the imposing array of precedents apparently through a
misconstruction of the Supreme Court's enunciations; it also runs counter
to the present trend toward reestablishment, either by statute or decision,18
of the common-law principle-a trend resulting from the realization that
"jury trial always functions best when subject . . to vigorous judicial
control." 14
Labor Law-Strike for a Closed Shop held Criminal Conspiracy-
The defendants, as non-employee officials of a union, were convicted of a
criminal conspiracy under a Maine statute ' for agreeing to conduct a strike
against a manufacturer to obtain a closed shop.2  There was no agreement
8. See Otis, supra note 6, at io7.
9. E. g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 47o (933) ; United States v.
Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394 (1933).
io. Ibid. To the same effect: Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 684 (894) ; Allis
v. United States, i55 U. S. 117 (1894) ; Dunbar v. United States, i56 U. S. 185 (895) ;
Hickory v. United States, i6o U. S. 408 (1895). The Murdock case does go so far as
to say that the judge should not express an opinion as to the defendant's guilt unless the
facts are not in dispute. 29o U. S. at 394. In view of the numerous cases adopting the
broad principle, however, it seems unlikely that the Court, by such language, meant to
limit all comments to such an exceptional situation.
ii. State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 246, 113 Atl. 458, 461 (i92o) ; State v. Haupt-
mann, 115 N. J. L. 412, 429, i8o Atl. 8og, 820 (1935).
12. People v. Lintz, 244 Mich. 603, 222 N. W. 201 (1928); Commonwealth v.
Berkenbush, 267 Pa. 455, iio Atl. 263 (i92o).
83. Three states have recently reverted to the older rule: California by constitu-
tional amendment in 1934, CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § Ig, Note (i937) 25 CALIF. L. Rzv.
212; Michigan by statute, MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 17322; Colorado by judicial
decision, Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (931). See also CODE oF CRM-
INAL PROCEDURE (Am. L. Inst. 193o) § 325.
14. Note (8937) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 212, 219.
I. "If two or more persons conspire and agree together, with the fraudulent or
malicious intent, wrongfully and wickedly to injure the person, character, business, or
property of another . . . they are guilty of a conspiracy, and every such offender
. .Ishall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by im-
prisonment for not more than three years." ME. Rwv. STAT. (930) c. 138, § 26.
2. The judge charged the jury that if the strike was for the purpose of obtaining
a closed shop it was an illegal strike and therefore a wrongful injury within the terms
of the statute.
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to picket or commit acts of violence charged. Held, (by an equally divided
court) that conviction should be sustained.3 State v. Mackesy, 135 Me. 488,
2oo Atl. 511 (1938), appeal dismissed for want of a properly presented
substantial federal question, 59 Sup. Ct. 230 (1938).
Prosecutions for criminal conspiracy were frequently used as a weapon
to curtail strikes by labor unions until about 19oo when the Debs case 4 indi-
cated the possibilities of the more speedy and effective injunction as a curb.
But with the use of injunctions limited by the recent wave of state and
federal anti-injunction statutes the instant case indicates the possibility of a
revival of such criminal prosecutions.5 The legal objections to the policy of
applying the conspiracy statute to labor unions took two forms in the instant
case. It was argued first, that the statute was so vague and indefinite that
it violated due process of law by not indicating to a reasonable man what
acts on his part would subject him to punishment thereunder, and secondly,
that if the terms of the statute were applied strictly, the right to strike was
taken away since the essence of a strike is the injury to the employer's busi-
ness.6 The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal on procedural
grounds, indicated by its citation of authorities 7 that the Maine statute was
not so vague and indefinite as to violate due process. While it is true that
the common law concepts of what constitutes malice or negligence in a
homicide case are as indefinite 8 as the terms "conspire" or "wrongfully
injure" in the instant statute, the application of the statute to a strike for a
closed shop seems particularly harsh where such a strike had been declared
unlawful previously only by dictum.9 It is apparent from the judge's charge
to the jury that the indictment would have failed if the strike had been for
a lawful purpose.10 But this also indicates that the defendants' second
argument, that the statute took away the right to strike, was not accurate
since the statute is limited in its application to what the court or legislature
determines are unlawful strikes. Although the Supreme Court's citation
of authority did not cover this argument, it has previously recognized that
neither the common law nor the Fourteenth Amendment confer the absolute
3. Since the court failed to state any reasons in its opinion it was necessary to
glean the issues of the case from the briefs of counsel and an unofficial copy of the
judge's charge to the jury. Hence it is impossible to determine whether the decision
was based on procedural or constitutional grounds.
4. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895) ; see Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the
Courts (932) io N. C. L. Rzv. 158, 161.
5. In the labor troubles involved in the instant case, an injunction was also issued
by the state court. See report of the Civil Rights Committee of the Nat. Lawyers'
Guild, E. Mass. Chapter, June I, 1937, Certain Legal Aspects of the Injunction and
Contempt Proceedings Connected with Lewiston-Auburn, Maine, Shoe Strike.
6. Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Mackesy v. State, 59 Sup. Ct. 230 (938).
7. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
providing criminal penalties for combinations in restraint of trade, held sufficiently
definite as incorporating the common law definition of restraint of trade) ; Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357, 368, 369 (1927). See also Aikens v. Wisconsin, i95 U. S.
194 (19o4) upholding the conviction under a Wisconsin statute, worded similarly to the
instant Maine statute, of three newspaper managers who had agreed to raise advertis-
ing rates to anyone placing advertising at an increased rates with a fourth competing
newspaper.
8. See Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (913).
9. See Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 400 et seq., z87 Atl. 692, 695
et seq. (1936) (Picketing by non-employees to enforce a closed shop where the em-
ployees are satisfied and refuse to join the union is illegal).
IO. See supra note 2.
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"right" to strike." But it has also been held that any restriction of the use
of the strike must be reasonable; 1 2 so the dismissal of the appeal in the
instant case might indicate that the Court does not regard the prohibition
of a strike for a closed shop suffidently arbitrary to warrant interference by
the federal courts. In view of the disagreement among the state courts on
the legality of the dosed shop,13 this would seem to be correct.
The instant case is of interest, however, in that it suggests how a state
may effectively nullify to a large extent labor's gains in national legislation.
It is clear from the Committee reports on the Wagner Act that Congress
did not intend to interfere with local policy on closed shops.1 4 Thus,
while the N. L. R. B. has held that the threat of an unlawful strike does not
deprive the union of its right to negotiate with the employer,1 5 such oppor-
tunity to bargain will have little value if labor's bargaining weapon is
taken away by holding the strike in question to be a criminal conspiracy.
Likewise, by broadening its definition of what constitutes an unlawful strike,
a state may limit the effect also of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That Act
provides that a federal court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction where
a labor dispute is involved unless, among other things, an "unlawful act" is
threatened.1 The language in a recent opinion of the Supreme Court
would seem to indicate that this clause may be interpreted to mean that
if a strike for a closed shop is unlawful according to the law of the state,
a federal injunction may issue even though there be a labor dispute.1 7 It
would seem therefore that a state under the present status of the law
may by its definition of an unlawful strike take a major step in determin-
ing the jurisdiction of a federal court to issue an injunction 's and, by its
criminal laws,' 9 render ineffective the bargaining provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act.
Sales-Foods-Implied Warranty of Purity-Husband and wife
entered a restaurant and ordered individually, the husband paying for the
meal. The wife was poisoned by impurities in the food and subsequently
brought suit in her own name on the basis of implied warranty. Held, that
ii. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 (1926). The fact that Justice Brandeis wrote
this opinion gives it current weight. See Mason, The Right to Strike (1928) 77 U. oF
PA. L. R-v. 52.
12. Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522 (1923) ; Wolff Packing Co. v.
Industrial Court, 267 U. S. 552 (925).
13. The states are about equally divided upon the legality of a strike for a closed
shop. See COMMONS AND ANDRmwS, PRINCIPLES OF LAoR LEGISLATION (4th ed. 1936)
391.
14. C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 2123.01, 2123.03, quoting both the Senate and
House Committee Reports on § 8 (3) of the Wagner Act.
15. I Lab. Rel. Rep. 87 (1938) (Second Annual Report of N. L. R. B., 1/17/38).
16. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 107 (Supp. 1938). Other factors than the
unlawful act are also necessary to confer jurisdiction.
I7. Lauf v. Shinner, 3o3 U. S. 323, 330, 331 (938).
18. See Simon v. Schwachman, 3 Lab. Rel. Rep. 571 (Mass. Sup. J. Ct. 1938)
(state anti-injunction statute and state labor relations acts do not change the common
law declaring a strike for closed shop unlawful).
ig. See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 HA v. L. REV. 393 for a historical
analysis indicating that the common law has been improperly applied to labor unions.
It is interesting to note that while this crime grew up under the English Law it is now
not a crime by statute in England. 38 and 39 Vic. c. 86 (7875). See also Hellerstein,
supra note 4, at 162, n. 16, where state criminal statutes that may be applied to labor
unions are outlined.
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the wife was a party to the contract of sale, and consequently could take
advantage of the implied warranty. Lockett v. A. and M. Charles, Ltd., 4
All English Rep. 170 (K. B. D. 1938).
The striking difference between this decision and American cases of
the same type is the failure of the instant court to discuss the nature of the
transaction and to determine whether it constituted a service or a sale.'
American courts consider such a determination necessary because under
the Sales Act 2 recovery on the basis of an implied warranty is predicated
upon the existence of a sale rather than a service. It is apparently conceded
in the instant case that under English law such a transaction is a sale, and
therefore that implied warranty was the proper theory of recovery.3 The
main point in controversy was whether the wife was in privity of contract
with the restaurateur, because unless such were the case, the dogma is that
she would not be allowed recovery on the basis of implied warranty. The
court, drawing a rather fine distinction, decided that in the absence of evi-
dence that the husband was "in charge of proceedings", the inference is
that the wife in ordering the food prima facie makes herself liable to pay
for it and is thus a party to the contract of sale.' The difficulty encountered
by the court in finding privity of contract as a prerequisite to the recovery
in implied warranty suggests a re-examination of the nature of such a war-
ranty." Originally sounding in tort,7 warranty was long regarded in the
nature of an action on the case for deceit, but having subsequently been
adopted by the law of contract, the majority of courts adhere to strict con-
tract principles and refuse recovery unless the plaintiff can show privity.8
There is, however, a growing minority 9 which refuses to follow the letter
of the law, and despite the absence of privity, allows the plaintiff to recover
on principles not strictly ex contractu.10 Two American courts dealing with
I. Friend v. Child's Dining Hall Co., 23z Mass. 65, 12o N. E. 407 (1918) ; Child's
Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 49o, 197 Atl. io5 (1938).
2. U NFoRm SALES Acr, art. 83, § 36; 1 Wn.Lisrox, LAW OF SALES (2d ed. 1924)
§ 242a. Cf. McCarley v. Wood Drugs, Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (934).
3. SALE OF GooDs Acr (z893) § 14: "Where the buyer, expressly or by implica-
tion, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are
of a description which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply . . . there
is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." In
order to invoke this enactment it is necessary to call the transaction a sale.
4. Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. x86 (925).
5. Cf. Regensteiner v. Canuto's Restaurant, Ltd., London Times, May 6, 1938, p.
4, col. 2.
6. Note (1929) 42 HARV. L. RMv. 4,4.
7. I STREET, FOUNDATioNs OF LEGAL LIAIITY (i9o6) § 377. See Ames, The
History of Assurnpsit (1888) 2 HAmv. L. Ray. r, 8.
8. Boyd v. Whitfield, ig Ark. 447 (858) ; Bordwell v. Collier, 45 N. Y.494 (1871).
9. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., z89 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (i92o) ; Challis
v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, I8 P. (2d) 199 (1933) ; Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works
of Pittsburgh, 1o2 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (193).
io. In Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, i1 So. 305 (1927),
where the plaintiff and another woman drove up to a refreshment stand and the latter
ordered and paid for the drinks, the court allowed recovery on the ground that the
woman paying for the drink had made a gift to the plaintiff, and since the gift carried
with it the title, and the implied warranty runs with the title, such of the public as
became the rightful owner of the coca-cola have a cause of action on this basis against
the manufacturer. Another possible theory of recovery mentioned by the court was that
the sale was to both of the ladies, regardless of which one ordered or paid for the
drinks, and the payment for the drinks was merely the settlement of the obligation or
debt incurred by both.
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the exact situation presented in the instant case fail even to consider the
question of privity.1l The most enlightened view, however, would allow
recovery in such situations on the basis of implied warranty sounding in
tort, which of course eliminates the difficulty of privity.
1 2
Taxation-Income Tax-Lessee's Improvements as Taxable
Income to Lessor-Petitioner leased real estate for a ten year term to
begin on the completion of such improvements, made by the lessee, as would
adequately equip a modem theater. Improvements were to become the
property of the lessor on the termination of the lease. The tax commissioner
added as income to the lessor in the year of the completion of the improve-
ments, one-tenth of the estimated value of the improvements as depreciated
at the end of the term.' Held, that restricted tothe facts presented, no tax-
able income accrued to petitioner. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 6 U.
S. L. WEEK 417 (U. S. 1938).
While the precise holding of the instant case can have merely a limited
effect upon the controversial problem of permanent improvements by a
lessee as taxable income, the implications of the decision are quite extensive.
Ramifications of the broad language employed may be analyzed in the light
of the requirements of source 2 and realization which leasehold improve-
ments must meet to be considered income to the lessor.3 As to the first
requirement, the value may be viewed as partaking of the nature of rent.
Particularly is this true when the improvements are required by the terms
of the leasing instrument.4 Within the confines of this theory, the Court
leaves open an avenue by which the increased value to the lessor may be
taxed by stating that improvements, even when required, are only taxable
when the intention of the parties is clear that they are to be deemed rent.
The findings of the lower court 5 were not felt to disclose such an intention
since the improvement requirements seemed primarily for the purpose of
securing rent payments, in that no particular items of improvement were
specified, and in that neither the time nor amount of expenditure was desig-
ii. In F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) the
plaintiff and three other women entered the defendant's place of business and sat down
at tables. One of the women offered to treat, and she paid in advance for what was
served. The plaintiff brought suit on the implied warranty of purity, but the question
of privity was not even mentioned by the court. Accord: Goetten v. Owl Drug Co.,
6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1936).
12. Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F. (2d) 864, 868 (App. D. C. 1936). See Note (1918)
27 YALE L. J. io68. Cf. Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 414. I WILLISTON, LAW OF
SALzs (2d ed. 1924) § 242b.
i. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 63, promulgated under 57 STAT. 178 (1932).
2. See MAGILL,.TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 333: ". . . for purposes of taxation,
various types of income take their colors from their sources." See Eisner v. Macomber,
252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920).
3. For a comparison of the meanings of income in an economic and legal sense, see
MAGILL, TAXA"LE INCOME (1936) 15. Of controlling importance in this discussion is
the definition the Court has given the term under U. S. CoNsT. Amend. XVI.
4. The value has been held taxable, however, though the improvements were op-
tional. Emma C. Morphy, 35 B. T. A. 289 (937); XI-2 Cu . Buu.. 64 (1932).
5. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
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nated.6 Even though the particular improvement be deemed income in the
nature of rent, that income must be realized. 7 If the discussion of the Court
be construed literally, it would seem that the improvements could not con-
stitute realized income to the lessor so long as he retains the improved prop-
erty. "Granting," said the Court, "that the improvements increased the
value of the building, that enhancement is not realized income of the
lessor." 8 It is deemed merely an "addition to capital". 9 This was the view
taken in the Hewitt case 10 where it was stated that, when the value received
by the lessor consists of something merged in the land and not of something
separately disposable, there is no taxable income. However, the problem
is beclouded somewhat by the final paragraph of the instant opinion declar-
ing that, assuming the improvements will sometime be income to the lessor,
they are not such in the year of erection for the reason that mere acquisi-
tion of title did not amount to a realization of gain." Thus it is uncertain
whether the Court meant that upon termination of the lease, income is
realized by the lessor, or whether they merely referred to a capital gain
which might accrue upon a subsequent sale by the lessor. The former
interpretation would seem to run counter to their prior unequivocal acknowl-
edgment that enhancement of value is not realized income, and to the general
tenor of judicial opinion previously modified though it may have been
in the case of leasehold improvements. 2 Although the language of the
opinion as a whole encompasses many phases of the leasehold improvement
problem, the care taken to confine the holding to the facts is an indication
that the problem is far from settled by the instant case.
Taxation-Taxability of Trust Property at Domicile of Joint
Trustee Where Trust is Administered in Another State-A New
Jersey domiciliary set up a trust by will probated in New Jersey, naming as
joint trustees three individuals domiciled in Pennsylvania and one New
Jersey trust company. The corpus is composed entirely of securities which
are kept in the possession of the New Jersey trustee, and all the trust affairs
are conducted in New Jersey. The lower court decided that the trustees
living in Pennsylvania must pay the state personal property tax on the
value of three-quarters of the trust fund. On appeal, it was held that the
6. Assuming a requisite intent, the problem remains unanswered as to the time
when rent income would become taxable. Prevailing opinion has generally been that
income was derived at the time of the completion of the improvements. See Miller v.
Gearin, 258 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, art. 63; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 94, art. 22 (a)-13. For criticisms of this rule, see I PAUL AND MERTNs, FEDERAL
INcoME TAXATION (1934) § 10.12; Austin, Are Leasehold Improvements Income?
(1934) 12 TAX MAG. 469; Green, Value of Improvements Erected by a Lessee as Tax-
able income of the Lessor for the Year in Which They Were Erected (1921) 6 ST.
Louis L. REv. 26. In support of the Court, it would seem that when the parties con-
template the improvement as part payment of rent, the value may well be constitution-
ally taxable on the same basis as a cash payment of rent. The problem would then be-
come a question of expediency in administration. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 20;
Austin, supra at 473.
7. There are three possibilities as to the time of realization: on the completion of
the improvement, during the rental period, and at the termination of the lease.
8. Instant case at 418.
9. Ibid.
io. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
II. Instant case at 418.
12. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 102.
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trust property was not subject to the taxing power of Pennsylvania, and an
apportionment of the tax to the three Pennsylvania trustees was not pro-
vided by the tax statute directing that "All personal property . . . owned
held or possessed by any resident whether . . . in his own right, or as
trustee . . ." shall be taxed.' In re Dorrance, et al., Trustees, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Jan. 5, 1939, P. I, col. 3 (Pa. 1939).
Philadelphia county taxed the whole corpus of trusts which were com-
posed of intangible assets and entirely administered in Philadelphia. In
one of these trusts there were three joint trustees: a Philadelphia corpora-
tion, an individual domiciled in Montgomery county, and a resident of
Florida. Held, that the power to tax the full value of the trust property is
conferred on the county in which the trust is administered. Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Company's Appeals, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 5, 1939,
p. I, col. 4 (Pa. 1939).
The court's rather curious construction of the tax statute as exempli-
fied by the two instant holdings cannot be objectively criticized. In view of
the inadequacy of the general language of the statute to cover a situation
where title is held jointly by iesident and nonresident trustees, any theory
of what the legislature intended must be largely conjectural. The inter-
pretation of the instant court is supported by authority in other states,
2
although it should be noted that after a similar holding in New York,3 the
legislature amended its statute to make possible the apportionment directed
by the lower court in the Dorrance case.4 But in relying on the language
of Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Virginia " and Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Fox 6 the court seemed to indicate that there were constitutional objec-
tions to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction to tax the Dorrance trust property
because a "trust domicile" had been established in New Jersey.7 This part
of the holding is questionable; for, as pointed out in the discussion of the
lower court decision in a previous isstue of the REviEw,5 even if the whole
trust is taxable at its "domicile" there is no controlling authority for the
proposition that the property is not also constitutionally taxable at the resi-
dence of the legal owner. Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions indi-
cate that the opposite is true. Furthermore, the wisdom of applying the
"domicile" theory to trusts has been doubted.' Such a departure from the
I. PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 72, § 3244.
2. Goodsite v. Lane, 139 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o5) ; Hawk v. Bonn, 6 Ohio C.
C. 452 (x892); Newcomb v. Paige, 224 Mass. 5i6, i13 N. E. 458 (1916); Thorne v.
State, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 412 (192o); Johnson v. Oregon City, 3 Ore. 13
(1868) ; State v. Phelps, 172 Wis. 147, 176 N. W. 863 (192o).
3. People v. Coleman, i19 N. Y. 137, 23 N. E. 488 (i89o) ; People v. Tax Com-
missioners, 17 N. Y. Supp. 923 (Sup. Ct. i8gi).
4. People v. Feitner, I68 N. Y. 36o, 6x N. E. 28o (19o); People v. Wells, 182
N. Y. 314, 74 N. E. 878 (i9O5).
5. 280 U. S. 83, 94 (1929). This case was not concerned with the instant problem
but with whether intangibles held in trust could be taxed to the beneficiary when the
trustee had been taxed in another state.
6. 298 U. S. 193, 209 (1936). The problem in this case was whether a corpora-
tion's accounts receivable and bank deposits had acquired a "commercial domicile"
within the taxing state and does not deal with the problem of resident and non-resident
trustees.
7. Harrison v. Commissioner, 272 Mass. 422, 172 N. E. 605 (193o) ; cf. State v.
Phelps, 172 Wis. 147, 176 N. W. 863 (1920).
8. (1938) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 24o.
9. Brown, The Taxation of Trust Property (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 403.
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orthodox rule that trusts are taxable at the domicile of the trustee will open
the way either to multi-state taxation or unjustifiable escape from tax bur-
dens, unless this theory is adopted by all states.10 And even if this be done,
the same danger will exist in cases where it is uncertain in what state the
trust is being administered. In any event, the solution should be left to the
legislatures through interstate agreements or uniform legislation, rather
than to the courts through an unjustified use of the due process clause.
Torts-Liability of Home Owners' Loan Corporation for Neg-
ligence-Plaintiff sued the Home Owners' Loan Corporation in tort
for injuries sustained when he fell upon ice on the sidewalk in front of
premises which were in the possession of the HOLC as a result of a mort-
gage foreclosure. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was
a federal instrumentality. Held, motion granted because defendant, being a
federal instrumentality, enjoyed the immunity of the United States, and no
consent having been given, could not be sued. in tort. Prato v. Home Own-
ers' Loan Corporation, 24 F. Supp. 844 (D. Mass. 1938). Accord:
Henson v. Eichhorn, 24 F. Supp. 842 (E. D. Ill. 1938) ; Swedock v. Home
Owners' Loan Corporation (1939) 6 U. S. L. WEEK 515 (Ohio C. P. 1938).
Plaintiff, a tenant, sued his lessor, the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion, for personal injuries resulting from negligent maintenance of prop-
erty acquired by it through foreclosure. Held, that the defendant was liable
in tort, since its activities in managing real estate, as distinguished from
its activities in refinancing mortgages, were "essentially private and propri-
etary". Gillen v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation, N. Y. L. J. Jan. 7,
1939, p. 81, col. i (N. Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1938).
It is axiomatic that the sovereign may not be sued without its consent.
Hence, once it is determined that any given organization is possessed of
the qualities of sovereignty, the question of its suability becomes a prob-
lem of defining the consent given.- It was this neatly logical device which
the court in the Prato case used to reach its decision.2 The controlling act
authorized the I-OLC to "sue and be sued in any court of competent juris-
diction." 1 Hence, the court had only to construe this Congressional grant
of consent to determine if it included liability in tort. In deciding that it did
not, the court followed traditional patterns, inasmuch as courts have jeal-
ously preserved to the sovereign immunity from tort liability even in the face
of statutes seemingly broad enough to destroy it.4 The difficulty with the
syllogism set up at the outset, however, lies in determining when a given
io. Thus, for example, if New Jersey rejects the "trust domicile" theory and only
taxes its resident trustee on a proportion basis, three-quarters of the Dorrance trust will
escape taxation. Conversely, if Florida likewise bases its tax on the domicile of the
trustee, one-third of the trust in the Fidelity-Philadelphia case will be taxed twice.
i. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163 (1894); Federal Land Bank v.
Gaines, 290 U. S. 247 (1933); Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935);
Lyle v National Home, 17o Fed. 842 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 19o9) ; Overholser v. National
Home, 68 Ohio St. 236, 67 N. E. 487 (19o3); Home Owners' Loan Corporation v.
Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, IOD S. W. (2d) 238 (1936).
2. Prato v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 24 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D. Mass. 1938).
3. 48 STAT. 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (1936).
4. Thompson v. State, 4 Ill. Ct. Cl. 26 (1921) ; Smith v. New York, 227 N. Y. 405,
125 N. E. 841 (192o) ; Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450 (1912).
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organization has absorbed unto itself the sanctity of sovereignty. The rea-
soning of the court in the Gillen case sufficiently illustrates this. In that
case, in applying the proprietary-governmental distinction that has been
observed with respect to state activities r the court found that the HOLC
was engaged in a proprietary activity at the time of the commission of the
acts complained of. With as little difficulty as the court in the Prato case
found the HOLC sovereign, the court in the Gillen case found it proprie-
tary.6 This proprietary-governmental distinction has apparently never been
directly approved by the Supreme Court in cases involving federal activity.
However, the Supreme Court has limited federal immunity by adhering to
the legal entity theory of corporations in holding that a suit against a gov-
ernment-owned corporation is not a suit against the Government.7 Of the
three lines of reasoning-complete sovereign immunity, corporate entity,
and proprietary activity-the last seems to be the best. The immunity doc-
trine grew up in another day when the concept of government was radically
different. While the doctrine is too firmly rooted to be discarded, there is
nevertheless no reason to extend it with every new extension of government
activity. The use of the essentially artificial legal entity theory of corpora-
tions, however, as a means of limiting the doctrine seems highly arbitrary.8
The proprietary-governmental distinction represents a more rational theory.
Apparently the only argument against applying this distinction to federal
activities is the theory that every federal enterprise, if constitutional, 9 must
necessarily be governmental 0 But the language in Federal Land Bank v.
S. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824) ;
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (19o5). But ef. Voorhis v. Cornell
Contracting Co., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 17, 1938, p. 2189, col. 3 (N. Y. City Ct. 1938) ; Le
Beau Piping Corp. v. City of New York, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 21, 1938, p. 2257, col. 7
(Sup. Ct 1938), holding the New York Port Authority not liable to suit in tort on the
theory that it partook of the sovereign immunity of its creators, New York and New
Jersey, since it was engaged in carrying out a governmental function.
6. There is also confusion in the decisions with respect to the liability of the
HOLC to garnishment. In Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn.
43, ioo S. W. (2d) 238 (1936), the court, finding that the corporation was a govern-
mental agency, held it not liable to garnishment. But in Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App.
134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273 (1936), the court held that the corporation was subject to gar-
nishment, saying: "There can be no question but that the corporation is an instrumen-
tality of the government, engaged in a great undertaking affecting the public. . . . yet
the acts have been authorized by Congress itself to be performed by and through the
arm of a private corporation, rather than by means of the exercise of power by a gov-
ernment officer, or by the legislative body itself." Id. at 137, 4 N. E. (2d) at 274.
Likewise the HOLC was held liable to garnishment in Central Market, Inc. v. King,
132 Neb. 380, 272 N. W. 244 (1937), and in H. & P. Paint Supply Co. v. Ortloff, 159
Misc. 886, 289 N. Y. Supp. 367 (City Ct. of N. Y. 1936).
7. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491 (192) ; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549 (1922).
8. The legal entity theory has frequently been taken up or laid aside according to
whether one or the other result has been desired. The concept is no less susceptible
to similar treatment in the present situation. Likewise, the concept of sovereignty would
seem capable of equally elastic application.
9. The HOLC was held constitutional in United States v. Kay, 89 F. (2d) 19 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1937). Although the judgment of the circuit court of appeals was vacated
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kay, 3o3 U. S. I (1937), the court expressly
refused to consider the point of constitutionality.
1o. See Lowndes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF
PA. L. Rzv. i. Cf. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L.
R y. 351, 372; (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REav. 3o8; (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 351, n. 13.
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Priddy 1 1 indicates that the Supreme Court does not incline toward this
theory, and certainly such a theoretical argument should not be allowed to
block a limitation of the immunity doctrine that is in harmony with current
governmental fashions.
ii. 295 U. S. 229 (1935). In an opinion holding the Federal Land Bank subject
to attachment on a combination of reasons (none of which alone would apparently have
been sufficient), the Court said: "They [Federal Land Banks] thus have many of the
characteristics of private business corporations, distinguishing them from the Govern-
ment itself and its municipal subdivisions, and from corporations wholly government
owned and created to effect an exclusively governmental purpose. This is a circum-
stance which gives some support to the inference that the intended scope of the liability
to suit includes judicial process incident to suit." Id. at 233.
